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ON TRADEMARKS, DOMAIN NAMES, 
AND INTERNAL AUCTIONS 
Gideon Parchomovsky* 
The first-in-time priority rule for appropriation of domain 
names has deprived various established businesses of the ability to use 
their valuable trademarks as their domain names. Many firms have 
seen their trademarks registered as domain names by "cybersquat­
ters" -individuals who register famous marks for the purpose of re­
selling them at a higher price to their owners-while others have 
watched smaller businesses win the registration race. The inability of 
established firms to use their trademark as their domain name im­
poses high costs not only on the firms, but also on Internet users who 
are forced to bear higher search costs when transacting on-line. 
Two legal solutions have emerged in response to this problem. 
In 1999, Congress enacted the Anticybersquatting Consumer Protec­
tion Act, establishing a new cause of action against cybersquatting. In 
addition, the International Corporation for Assigned Names and 
Numbers (JCANN) -the entity responsible for assigning domain 
names- has instituted rules for arbitration of domain name disputes. 
Central to both solutions is the "good-faith" standard: if the domain­
name registrant acted in good faith, she should retain the domain 
name. 
In this essay, Professor Parchomovsky argues that neither solu­
tion provides an adequate mechanism for resolving disputes over 
domain names. Both solutions are unnecessarily expensive and time­
consuming, and neither guarantees the efficient allocation of domain 
names. A superior solution would be an asymmetric internal auction 
system to resolve domain-name disputes. The auction mechanism 
would ensure that the disputed domain·name ends up in the hands of 
its highest value user, while granting just compensation to the other 
party. Furthermore, it accomplishes this result instantaneously and at 
negligible cost. 
* Associate Professor, Fordhom University School of LAw. 
I om indebted to /an Ayres, Abraham Bell, Kirsten Edwards, Bob El/ick:ton, Jill Fisch, Hugh Han· 
:sen, Jay Ke:san, Doug LU:hmu:ln, Yael Lu:srmann, David McGowan, R.S. Ophir, Mark Pauerson, Tony 
Reese, Joel Reidenberg, Dan Richman, Peter Siegelman, Steve The/, and Tom Ulen for invaluable com­
ments and criticisms. For excellent research assistmJce, I would like to thank Michael Pereif'Q and Rich­
ard Thomas. 
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I. INTRODUCTION 
The rapid evolution of the Internet into a principal medium of 
commerce has taken many established businesses by surprise, leaving 
them out of step with the new reality. As these heavy-hitting, yet slow­
moving giants have finally awakened, they have discovered- much to 
their dismay-that they can no longer register their vaunted trademarks 
as domain names. Cyberprospectors, and other smaller business enter­
prises have beaten them to the registry. This "fliSt come, first served" 
priority rule has substantially disadvantaged many established corpora­
tions, forcing them to buy back the right to use marks and symbols they 
labored to develop, or adopt a different, less recognizable, domain name. 
Examples are legion. Giant multi-billion-dollar businesses, such as 
Apple Computer,1 Morgan Stanley Dean Witter & Co.,2 Federal Ex­
press,3 and the World Wrestling Federation4 have been forced to find a 
way to wrestle their trademarks from the hands of entrepreneurial indi­
viduals who recognized the potential of e-commerce slightly ahead of 
them. Even the New York Yankees, Major League Baseball's world 
champions in four out of the last five baseball seasons, fell behind, at 
least in the first inning, in their "match" against Brian McKiernan, a 
forty-one-year-old fan, who registered the domain name <newyorkyan­
kees.com>.' 
Some of these businesses managed to rebound with relative ease. In 
the case of Apple Computer, for example, the mere threat of a trade­
mark infringement suit sufficed to prompt the domain name appropria­
tor, a sixteen-year-old Canadian teenager, to renounce ownership of the 
domain name <www.appleimac.com>.6 Other companies were less for­
tunate. Compaq Computer Corporation had to pay $3.35 million for the 
1. See Patrick McGeehan & Man Richtel, What's in a Web Addreu? Maybe a Lawsuit, N.Y. 
TIMES, Oet. 22, 1999, at AI. 
2. See id. 
3. See linda Rosencrance, FedEx Domain Suit Filed; Suggested: Dostana Enterprises Says It 
Want; to .Ramn me Right to Us;: "waddtmtime.wrn·, Cviftl'UieR WORLD, Feb. 14, 2006, ii 4. 
4. See Jery Causing, Wrestling Group WillS Back Use of Its Name on Internet, N.Y. TIMES, Jan. 
17, 2000, at C4. The dispute was ultimately resolved through arbitration. See WWF WillS Domain 
Name TraiiSfer in First ICANN Arbitration, ANDREWS COMPUTER & ONLINE INDUS. Lmo. REP., 
Mar. 7, 2000, at 9; M. Scott Donahey & RyanS. Hilbert, Case Note, World Wrestling Federation En· 
tertainment, Inc. v. Michael Bosman: A Legal Body Slam for CybersqUiltters on the Web, 16 SANTA 
CLARA COMPUTER & HIGH TECH. W. 419,421 •2000). 
S. See New York Yankees v. McKiernan, No. 99-CV-8449 (E.D.N.Y. filed Dec. 23, 1999): see 
also Mary Huhn, Yanks Sue QIIS. Fan; Boss Wants His Website, N.Y. POST, Dec. 29, 1999, at 34; Neil 
MacFarquhar, ThoSI! DomifiDnl Yankees F18hl for a Domain Name, N.Y. TIMES, Jan. 6. 2000, at B3. 
Other famous oommerdal entities and organizations that found themselves in a similar predicament 
include, inter alia, the sponsors of America's Cup yacht race; the National Football League; Easter­
man Kodak Co.; QVC Inc., the home-shopping network; and Harvard University. See Debra Baker, 
Standing Up to CybenqUilllers: Judges Are Seizing on New Legislation to Keep Web Sire Pirates From 
Taking a Name for Themselves, A.B.A. J., Mar. 2000, at 18, 18-19. 
6. See McGeehan & Richtel, supra note l, at At. 
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right to use the domain name <altavista.com>.7 Faring a little better, 
McDonald's consented to wire a high school to the Internet in considera­
tion for the domain name <www.mcdonalds.com>.8 Other corporations, 
such as Morgan Stanley Dean Witter & Co.9 and Panavision,10 reached an 
impasse in their negotiations with the domain·name holders and had to 
resort to litigation to obtain the right to use their trademarks as domain 
names. 
'Trademark owners,· however, are not the only group harmed by the 
first-in-time rule that governs allocation of domain names. A second, 
widely overlooked, group of ·victims are the conSumers of the trademark 
owners, who are deprived of the cheapest, and least time consuming, way 
of transacting on-line. Unab�e to find businesses where they expect­
using the trademark or the business's name as a domain name-millions 
of consumers are forced to engage in treacherous and time-consuming 
"term searches" in order to find the merchandise or services they seek to 
purchase; 
· 
· To alleviate the plight of the trademark owners and their consum­
ers, President Clinton signed into law the Anticybersquatting Consumer 
Protection Act (ACPA) on November 29, 1999.1 1 The act amended sec­
tion 43( d) of the Lanham Act to 'create a cause of action against cyber­
squattingP The act defines cybersquatting as a bad-faith attempt to 
profit, register, or traffic in a domain name that at the time of its registra­
tion was identical or confusingly similar to a distinctive or famous trade­
mark.13 
In a similar vein, the Rules for Uniform Domain Name Dispute 
Resolution Policy (UDRP), promulgated by the International Corpora­
tion for Assigned Names and Numbers (ICANN), adopts bad faith as the 
linchpin of its scheme.14 Specifically, paragraph 4(a)(iii) of UDRP de­
fines "applicable disputes" as ones in which the domain-name registrant 
appropriated in bad faith a name identical or confusingly similar to the 
complainant's trademark.1s 
1. Se£ Compaq and A!taVi.ita Seide lr.:ar.ct AddscN Di.Jpu:e, WAU.. ST. J., JuJy29, 1998, ca Bl2; 
see also Aaron W. Brooks, The Cawious Interplay Between Tradefl1llrks and Interne/ Domain Names, 
88Iu.. B.J. 74, 74 (2000). 
8. See The Early Show: CybtrsqU4lters Come Unckr Fire (CBS television broadcast, Dec. 16, 
1999), available aJ1999 WL 16015902 [hereinafter The Early Show] . 
9. See McGeehan & Richtel, supra note 1, at Al. The disputed domain name 
<www.m.sdw.com> now serves as Morgan Stanley Dean Witter & Co.'s home page. 
10. See Panavision lnt'l, L.P. v. Toeppen, 141 F.3d 1316, 1319 (9th Cir. 1998) (holding that de· 
fendant's actions violated trademark laws). 
ll. Pub. L. No. 106-113, § 3002, 113 Stat. 1501A-545 (1999). 
12. See 15 U.S.C.A. § 112S(d) (West Supp. 2000). 
13. See id. § 112S(d)(l)(A). 
14. See ICANN, Uniform Domain Nome Displlle Reso/Ulion Policy, Dl http:l/www.icann.org/udrp 
/udrp-policy-24oct99.htm (last updated June 4, 2000) (hereinafter UDRP] (on file with the University 
of Illinois Law Review}. 
15. Jd. t 4(a)(iii). 
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Although these solutions are a step in the right direction, they are 
hardly satisfactory. First, neither approach provides a comprehensive so­
lution to the problem. Second, and more importantly, the reliance of 
both solutions on the good faith of the domain-name registrant is welfare 
diminishing relative to other alternatives that could-and in my opinion, 
should-have been adopted. 
The ACPA is incomplete because it only covers conflicts in which 
the trademark preceded the domain name; only trademark owners whose 
marks were famous or distinctive at the time of the domain name's regis­
tration can take advantage of the new anticybersquatting cause of ac­
tion.16 Yet, given the rate of appropriation of domain names, it is quite 
likely that future conflicts will involve trademark owners who developed 
a distinctive or famous mark after the registration of the domain name­
that is, conflicts between first-in-time domain-name registrants and later­
in-time trademark owners. Secondly, the act only applies to trademarks 
that were famous, distinctive, or registered nationally at the time of the 
domain name registration.�' Marks that gained the required status at 
some later time are not covered by the Bill. The UDRP avoids these 
problems but it is inexhaustive as it allows the parties to opt out at any 
time during the arbitration process and litigate instead.18 Moreover, any 
decision of the arbitration panel can be appealed to a court of law.19 
More importantly, from the standpoint of economic efficiency, the 
reliance on good faith is problematic for two principal reasons. First, 
good faith is a notoriously fuzzy standard, infamous for breeding uncer­
tainty. Consequently, it impairs the ability of both trademark and do­
main-name owners to ascertain the status and strength of their respective 
entitlements vis-a-vis one another. Second, the good-faith standard does 
not guarantee an efficient allocation of resources. Economic efficiency 
concerns itself with the efficient allocation of resources. More particu­
larly, it seeks to ensure that resources wind up in the hands of the highest 
value users. 20 Accordingly, in a dispute between a trademark holder and 
a domain-name registrant, economic efficiency prescribes that the party 
who values the domain name more highly should ultimately get it, inde­
pendently of whether the domain-name registrant acted in good faith. 
16. See 15 U.S.CA. § 1125(d)(l)(A){ii)(l)-(II) (stating that for a cause of action to accrue, a 
mark must be "distinctive" or "famous« the time of registration of the domain name") (emphasis 
added). 
17. It must be noted that it is often difficult to delerm.ine whether a mark is sufficiently famous 
or distinctive. As one commentator points out, "Coca-Cola may present no problem, but what hap­
pens when the Acme Fertilizer Co. wants the same address as the Acme Fertility Clinic Co. 1" John 
Gibeaut, Staking an Internet Claim: The Rush to Grab a Site Nanu Has Led to New Rules, But No One 
to Enforce Them, A.B.A. J ., July 1999, at 82, 82. 
18. See UDRP, supra note 14,! 4(k). 
19. Seeid 
20. See RICHARD A. PosNER, EcONOMIC ANALYSIS OF LAW 13-17 (5th ed. 1998) (discussing 
value, utility. and efficiency). 
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A simple example may help illustrate this point. Assume that Char­
lie Klein, an astute student at the University of Illinois College of Law, 
registers the domain name <ck.com>. Charlie's appropriation of the 
name clearly imposes a cost on Calvin Klein who now has to adopt and 
advertise a new name. Furthermore, Charlie's use of the domain name 
imposes a considerable cost on Calvin's consumers. Thus, economic effi­
ciency requires that Calvin Klein get the domain name. Yet, neither the 
ACPA nor UDRP guarantee this result: Charlie's initials potentially 
immunize him against any legal action by the trademark owner. 
One might argue, though, that this result should not worry us. Pri­
vate bargaining between the parties would ensure the efficient outcome. 
As Coase demonstrated, in a world without transaction costs legal enti­
tlements are irrelevant.21 Alas, the Coasean world in which transacting is 
cost-free is very far from the real world-especially, insofar as the pre­
sent context is concerned. Bargaining between domain-name registrants 
and trademark owners presents the problem of bilateral monopoly.22 In 
such negotiations there is only one buyer and only one seller, and conse­
quently, the price of the transaction is indeterminable, ex ante. Knowing 
that the other party must transact with her, or not at all, each of the par­
ties to the negotiation will assay to extract as much of the bargaining sur­
plus as possible -a strategy that dramatically increases transaction costs, 
as well as the likelihood of negotiation breakdown.23 Therefore, private 
negotiation between the parties may not, in general, be relied upon to ef­
fect an efficient allocation of domain names. Moreover, even when such 
negotiation does result in an efficient outcome, the cost of attaining this 
outcome-i.e., the transaction cost-is likely to be quite significant. 
An efficient way to overcome the bilateral monopoly problem, and 
ensure that the domain name ends up in the hand of its higher value user, 
is provided by auction theory. The virtue of auctions lies in their ability 
to force parties to reveal private information, thereby eliminating the in· 
centive to negotiate strategically. Thus, auctions can guarantee the effi. 
cient allocation of resources when standard negotiations fail. Drawing 
21. S� Ronald H. Cuai(:, The Fwbl<:m uf Scx:iul Cost, 3 j,L. &. EcoN. i, 2-6 (i9<i0}. 
22. For a comprehensive review of the literature on strategic barriers to bilateral negotiation, see 
Robert Cooter. The Cost of Coase, 11 J. LEGAL Sruo. 1, 23 (19112) (pointing out that disagreements as 
to how to divide the contractual surplus may prevent successful Coasean bargaining); John Kennan &. 
Robert Wilson, Bargaining with Private Information, 31 J. ECON. LITERATURE 45, 46 (1993) (hypothe­
sizing that differences in private information are a primary cause of bargaining delays); Robert P. 
Merges, Of Property Rules, Coase, and lntellecJUQ/ Propeny, 94 CoLUM. L. REv. 2655, 2659 (1994) 
(observing that in tbe field of intellectual property the valuation problem heightens the possibility of 
strategic bargaining); Eric L. Talley, Note, Contract Renegotiation, Meclumism Design, and the Liqui­
dated Damages Rule, 46 STAN. L REv. 1195, 1198, 1219 (1994) (discussing the problem of bilateral 
monopoly in contract renegotiation). 
23. The negotialion between the National Football League, widely known as "The NFL," and 
"NFL Today," a gambling site, provides an illuminating example. The NFL offered to pay $270 for 
the disputed domain names, and NFL Today countered by asking for $120,000. See Jon A. Baumgar­
ten et al., Washington Walch: Recently Enacted Antieybersquatting LegislaJion Is Basis of LaW$uia, 
CYBERSPACE LAW., Jan. 2000, at 17. 
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on auction theory, I propose that disputes between trademark and do­
main-name owners be resolved through an asymmetric internal auction 
in which the domain name will be auctioned off between the parties. The 
auction may be initiated by any of the parties unilaterally, and will pro­
ceed in two stages: First, the auction administrator will screen out do­
main-name registrants for eligibility. The screening test to be applied is 
added value. Only registrants who add independent value to the name 
by actively using it in trade should be eligible to enter the auction. Reg­
istrants who do not add value- widely known as "warehousers" and "cy­
bersquatters" -are essentially free riders who seek to capitalize on the 
trademark owner's investment in goodwill, without generating any social 
benefit. Because this behavior is socially undesirable, the law should dis­
courage it by restoring the names to their trademark owners who made 
them valuable. 
Second, the domain name will be auctioned off between the do­
main-name registrant and the trademark owner in a closed bid auction. 
The auction will proceed according to the following rules:24 
(a) Each bidder will post a bond in the amount of her bid. 
(b) If the trademark owner submits the higher bid, she will get 
the domain name for a price equal to the bid of the domain-name 
registrant. 
(c) If, by contrast, the domain-name owner submits the higher 
bid, she will retain the domain name but she will have to pay the 
amount of her bid to the trademark owner. 
(d) At the end of the auction, the domain name will become inal­
ienable for a period of two years. 
As I will demonstrate, these rules provide each of the parties with 
an incentive to submit a bid that closely approximates her private valua­
tion of the domain name. The trademark owner, who presumably values 
the name more highly, but fears "extortion," will reveal her true valua­
tion, because the price she will have to pay does not depend on the bid 
she submits. Admittedly, the domain-name registrant will not reveal her 
true valuation; rather, she will shade her bid up somewhat. Yet, her stra­
tegic ability to exaggerate her valuation is capped by the fear that she 
might end up paying the amount of her bid and the requirement to post a 
bond in this amount. Excessively raising the bid is a self-defeating strat­
egy for the domain-name owner because the bid amount may tum out to 
be the price she ultimately pays. Under the proposed mechanism, the 
domain-name registrant cannot be sure, ex ante, whether she will end up 
receiving or paying her bid. Consequently, she will be cautious not to 
overplay her cards. Thus, as long as the parties bid rationally, at the con­
clusion of the auction, the domain name will reach the party who values 
24. For discussion of alternative auction rules, see infra Part IV.C. 
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it more. Moreover, the proposed auction accomplishes this result at a 
negligible cost without need for extensive negotiation or litigation. 
II. WHAT'S IN A [DOMAIN) NAME? 
Slightly rephrased, Shakespeare's rhetorical question of almost five 
centuries ago, "what's in a name?"25 can be succinctly answered. When 
the term "domain" is inserted right before "name" the answer is straight­
forward: a lot. Indeed, very few assets have increased in value and 
commercial importance as rapidly as domain names. The domain name 
<business.com> was recently auctioned off for $7.5 million26 and 
<wine.com> for the more "modest" amount of $3 million.27 Perhaps 
even more astounding is the rate at which domain names are being ap­
propriated.28 In 1999, new domain names were claimed and registered at 
a rate of 300,000 per month.29 Yet, if one pauses to reflect, she will find 
out that this trend is completely justifiable. 
The meteoric ascent of domain names is inextricably related to the 
ascent of the Internet as a primary medium of commerce.30 Metaphori­
cally speaking, domain names are the traffic signs of the Internet. With­
out them, the Internet would not be an "information superhighway," at 
least not insofar as e-commerce is concerned. As was the case with many 
other valuable resources in the history of American property, domain­
name appropriation has been governed by the first-in-time rule.:ll Unfor-
25. WlWAM SHAKESPEARE, ROMEO AND JULIET 210 (Jill Levinson ed., Oxford Univ. Press 
2000). 
26. See The Early Show, supra note 8. 
27. See CBS Evening News: Competilion Over Reserving Domain Names on the Internet (CBS 
television broadcast, Nov. 7, 1999) [hereinafter CBS Evening News). It is interesting to note that nei­
ther the term «business" nor the term "wine" CQuld be claimed as trademarks because both terms are 
generic. They C<luld, and indeed were, registered as domain names because those limitations applica­
ble to trademarks do not apply to domain names. Indeed, for this very reason generic words make the 
most valuable domain names: they are highly valuable because of their simplicity and registering them 
does not run the risk of being sued by a disgruntled trademark owner. 
28. Having realized that 70% of the population of the U.S. shares one of only 9,000 last names, 
Jerry Sumpton, a Canadian entrepreneur, teamed up with a group of investors, and registered the 
na�� of QVer 60% <�f the popul!'tion. See �ott Woolley, !mem� M!UtU of Yaw Dc�P.ai.>t: Wan1 :o 
R(!S(f!;I'Vf! Yow Surn411W em rhe Net? TiXJ l..ate-A Firm You Nt:��er lleard of Probably Owns II, 
FORBES, July 26, 1999, at 244. 
29. See CBS Evening News, supra note 27. To date, almost 33 million domain names have been 
registered worldwide, with the vast majority, over 20 million, in the .com Top Level Domain. See 
NETNAMES, LATEST DoMAIN STATS, at http://www.netnames.C<lm (last updated Dec. 6, 2000) (on file 
with the Universily of Illinois l..aw Review). 
30. The numbers are staggering. The International Data Corp. estimates that the Internet econ­
omy will reach $3 trillion by 2003. See Int'l Data Corp., /DC Expects the Worldwide Internet Economy 
ro Exceed $1 Trillion b)' 2001, at http://www.idc.com/Datallnternet/content/NETll0399PRhtm (Nov. 
3, 1999) (on file with the University of Illinois Law Rt:��iew). As one commentator noted, this figure 
"may well translate into an ever-increasing demand for domain names." Latifa Mitchell-Stephens, 
ICANN Expands Donutin Name Landscape, E-CoMMERCE, Mar. 2000, at 1 (on file with the University 
of Illinois Law Review). 
31. See generally JESSE DUKEMINIER & ]AMES KRIER, PROPERTY 14-15 (4th ed.l998) (empha­
sizing the importance of the C<lncept of first occupancy or possession). 
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tunately, in the rush to allocate domain names to first comers, policy 
makers completely ignored the obvious tension between this rule of ap­
propriation and trademark protection. For a modest fee of $70, any legal 
entity can register any previously unregistered domain name it desires; 
no other restrictions apply. As a result, cyberprospectors could register 
for themselves the trademarks of many established companies and even 
famous individuals.32 Slowly getting a grip on the new commercial real­
ity, those businesses are forced to choose among three undesirable op­
tions: (1) negotiate a consensual transfer of the domain name; (2) litigate 
the matter; or (3) adopt a brand-new domain name.33 I discuss these op­
tions in reverse order. 
A. Creating a New Domain Name 
The option of adopting a new domain name is highly unattractive to 
most businesses. From the vantage point of trademark owners, this 
strategy implicates two types of costs-both of them quite substantial. 
The first is the cost of establishing a new domain name; the second is the 
cost of ceding control of a trademark to a third party. 
Establishing a new domain name inv�lves two distinct, yet related, 
challenges: finding an appropriate domain name and introducing it to 
the market place. Finding a fitting domain name is likely to be an ex­
tremely difficult task. For a domain name to serve its purpose -creating 
a means of communication with consumers-it must be associated with 
the company's products or image, and, in addition, it must be sufficiently 
easy to remember and use. The challenge of finding the proper name is 
exacerbated by the high rate of appropriation of domain names. If ini­
tially it was relatively easy to adopt substitute names, marketable names 
are now very difficult to find. Cybersquatters have already appropriated 
most valuable domain names, and businesses seeking to adopt a new 
name will in all likelihood have to negotiate a consensual agreement with 
the name's appropriator. 
Even if the challenge of selecting a new name is successfully over­
come, businesses engaging in this enterprise will have to bear the cost of 
introducing the new domain name to the market. Introducing a new 
domain name to the market typically necessitates massive expenditures 
on advertising in order to instill the new domain name in the consumer 
consciousness. It bears emphasis that the costs of familiarizing consum-
32. For example, Esther Dyson is a famous Internet guru who wrote numerous articles and 
books on the Internet. Yet, even she was deprived of the right to use her name aa her domain name. 
Now the domain name <estherdyson.com> cannot be registered. Other celebrities who were con­
fronted with a similar problem include Brad Piu, Elton John, and Courtney Love. The names of the 
deceased Kurt Cobain and Elvis Presley have also been appropriated. Su Howard Siegel &. Steven R. 
Doran, Chtuing Down CybersqUiltters Who Register Celebrity Domain Names, 15 No. 12 ENT. L &: 
F1N. 1 (2000). 
33. To the best of my knowledge, very few businesses, if any, elected the third alternative, at 
least initially. 
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ers with a new domain name that is different from, and often unrelated 
to, the company's trademark may be much higher than the cost of estab­
lishing the trademark itself. In fact, consumers' familiarity with the 
trademark makes it more difficult for them to accept the new domain 
name, as well as to adjust to the fact that they cannot use the trademark 
to reach the company's website. Furthermore, even if a company is suc­
cessful in establishing a new domain name, it will still be disadvantaged 
vis-a-vis its competitors because this company will bear the additional 
cost of promoting both its trademark and its domain name in the future. 
A company whose domain name differs from its trademark foregoes the 
economies of scale that are available to companies that use their trade­
mark as their domain name. 
While the costs of establishing a new domain name are clearly sub­
stantial, the cost of ceding control of a trademark to a third party may 
prove to be even higher. Domain name appropriators may impose four 
types of costs on trademark owners. I enumerate those costs in the order 
of the severity of their impact on trademark owners. 
· 
First, the domain-name registrant may passively store the domain 
name and not use it at all. Doing so yields no positive returns to the do­
main-name registrant. Yet this strategy imposes a cost on the trademark 
owner as it· prevents her from using an extremely valuable mode of 
communication in interacting with her customers. Furthermore, the in­
ability of the trademark owner to use the mark in on-line commerce may 
frustrate customers and, at the margin, prod some of them to switch to 
other products and services.34 In a medium of commerce that is predi­
cated on speed, in which the attention span of users is extremely short, 
any delay or friction may prove very costly.35 
Second, the domain-name registrant can use the domain name to 
generate revenues from advertising. This, for example, was how Brian 
McKiernan elected to use the vaunted domain name <newyorkyan­
kees.com>. In this business model, the domain-name registrant operates 
an advertisement site that sells advertisement space to other business, 
with the domain name serving as bait to attract customers, or "eye­
bal1s,"36 to her site. In many cases, these customers will find themselves 
"trapped" or "mousetrapped" in the website, unable to el'it without 
34. The ability to bring customers speedily to one's website is key to success in e-commerce. As 
Carl Shapiro and Hal Varian point out, "the most popular Web sites belong to the search engines, 
those devi<:es that allow people to find information they value and ignore the rest." CARL SHAPIRO&. 
HAL R. VARIAN, INFORMATION RULES 6 (1999). 
35. As the Nobel Prize Laureate, economist Herbet Simon put it: "[A] wealth of information 
creates a poverty of attention." Herbert A. Simon, Designing Organir.ations for an Information· Rich 
World, in COMPUTERS, COMMUNIC ATIONS, AND TilE PUBLIC INTEREST 37-52 (Martin Greenberger 
ed., 1971), reprinted in THE ECONOMICS OF COMMUNICATION AND INFORMATION 187, 190 (Donald 
M. Lam berton ed., 1996). 
36. The term "eyeballs" signifies "visitors" in the cyberspace vernacular. 
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clicking on a succession of ads.37 The impact of this strategy to the 
trademark owner may be quite devastating. Customers who get mouse­
trapped once may never again seek to transact on-line with the trade­
mark owner whose site they could not find, choosing to transact instead 
with competing businesses whose sites could be located more readily. 
Third, the domain-name registrant may use the domain name to op­
erate a website whose content- typically adult entertainment-may 
sully the reputation of the trademark owner. Such a use threatened the 
reputation of an established toy manufacturer, Hasbro, Inc., which has 
held a forty-seven-year trademark on the children's board game, 
"Candyland." Hasbro was stunned to find out that Internet Entertain­
ment Group, Inc. registered the domain name <www.candyland.com>, 
which it used as an on-line porn page.38 Such reputation-ruining uses are 
advantageous for the domain-name registrant for two main reasons. 
First, uses such as adult sites are often highly profitable. Second, uses 
that adversely affect the reputation of the trademark owner's business 
pressure the trademark owner to buy back the domain name.39 
Finally, the domain-name registrant may operate a site directly 
competing with the business of the trademark owner. Returning to my 
original hypothetical, Charlie Klein, having secured the domain name 
<ck.com>, could start his own line of fragrances that would compete with 
those of Calvin. This strategy presents a direct challenge to the trade­
mark owner's market share and may result in a substantial drop in reve­
nues for the trademark owner.40 
Given the costs and risks implicated by the option of establishing a 
new domain name, businesses will be extremely reluctant to surrender 
their trademarks to third parties for e-commerce purposes, and establish 
in their stead new domain names. 
B. Initiating Legal Action 
The second strategy established businesses can adopt against do­
main-name registrants is to initiate legal action. Rather than cede their 
valuable marks, trademark owners can turn to the legal system in an at-
37. See Shields v. Zuccarini, 89 F. Supp. 2d 634, 635 (E.D. Pa. 2000) (enjoining defendant from 
operating websites that trapped or Kmousetrapped" visitors). 
38. See Paul M. Eng & Marsha Johnston, Get Your Hands Off My .Com, Bus. WK., July 28, 
1997,at88. 
39. Of course, this strategy may backfire and prompt the trademark owner to take legal action 
against the domain-name registrant in order to regain the right to use the domain name. This is what 
happened in the dispute between Hasbro and lEO. Hasbro sued lEO for trademark dilution and ul­
timately prevailed on its lawsuit. See Hasbro, Inc. v. Internet Entm't Group, Ltd., No. C96-130WD, 
1996 WL 84853, at •t (W.O. Wash. Feb. 9, 1996). I discuss the litigation option in greater detail else­
where in this piece. See infra Part II.B. 
40. In such cases, the trademark owner may have a cause of action against the domain-name 
registrant for trademark infringement. It bears emphasis, however, that the domain-name registrant 
can diminish, and even eliminate, her potential trademark liability by adopting a distinct trademark. 
See supra notes 16-17 and accompanying text. 
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tempt to regain the lost goods. Trademark law and the law of torts pro­
vide trademark owners with an impressive arsenal of causes of action 
a gainst domain-name registrants, the most salient of which are trade­
mark infringement, trademark dilution, and unfair competition.41 
Yet, the litigation option has several drawbacks. First, legal action 
is time-consuming and costly.42 Disputes over domain names may take 
years to resolve, and as long as the dispute lingers the domain name can­
not be used. This problem renders the legal action option irrelevant to 
many businesses. Given the speed at which e-commerce develops, busi­
nesses can ill-afford delays in launching their on-line operations. A busi­
ness that decides to engage in e-commerce needs a domain name right 
away. Thus, despite the pitfalls of this strategy, it makes more sense for 
most businesses to adopt a new domain name rather than wait for the le­
gal system to determine the status of the disputed domain name. 
Moreover, initiating legal action exposes established businesses to 
potential reputational harms. In this context, the public often views the 
domain-name registrant as a David fighting a Goliath, and in the best 
tradition of American sports, it sides with the domain-name registrant. 
The dispute between eToys and Etoy is a case in point.43 eToys, the 
Web's leading toy retailer, resolved to bring a trademark infringement 
suit against Etoy, a European group of conceptual artists, for using a con­
fusingly s.imilar name to that of eToys. Of particular concern to eToys 
was the fact that Etoy's website contained profane language and violent 
graphic images. However, eToys was forced to reverse its decision to 
seek legal action after they received "'lots and lots of communications 
that urged [themJ to find a way to coexist with Etoy."'44 
In other cases, the reputational harm may come not from the public, 
but from the domain-name holder who attempts to raise public support. 
41. A claim of trademark infringement requires a showing that the allegedly infringing use will 
likely cause consumer confusion. See 1' U.S.C. § 1114(1) (1994 &: Supp. IV 1998). A claim of trade­
mark dilution requires a showing that the challenged use "dilutes" the value of a trademark. See id. § 
1125(<:)(2). Finally, an unfair competition claim arises whenever a person, in a �ommercial sening, 
makes false or misleading representations as to the origin of goods and services or a fact, and as a re· 
suit consumer confusion is likely to occur. See id. § 1125(a)(l). For a review of the case law prior to 
Nuvemlict 1999, liCe DaviJ Yan, Nut<:, Virtual Reuiiiy. Cun We Riu'f: Trademurk L.zw io Surf Cybet· 
space'!, 10 FORDHAM lNTELL. PROP. MEDIA & ENT. LJ. 773, 795-803 (2000). 
Ironically, none of the traditional causes of action is readily applicable to warehousers, who charac· 
teristicaUy do not use the names they register. Faced with this problem, the court in Panavision lnt'l, 
L.P. v. Toeppen, 141 F.3d 1316 (9th Cir. 1998), went to great lengths to find for the plaintiff on a 
trademark-dilution claim. Stretching the conventional meaning of dilution, the court established the 
defendant's practice of selling domain names back to the relevant trademark owners constituted a 
commercial use. See id. at 1326-27. 
42. For a recent review of the costs of litigation, see Gillian K. Hadfield, The Price of Law: How 
the Markel for Lawyers Distorts the Justice System, 98 MICH. L. REV. 953 (2000). 
43. See Matthew Mirapaul, An and Co1111Mrce Collide Online as eToys Tries to Share What It 
Sees as Its Turf with an Ans Group, N.Y. TIMES, Dec. 30, 1999, at C3. 
44. /d.; see also Steve Kettmann, Victory for Etoy Is at Hand, at http://www.wired.com/newsl 
politicsl0,1283,33907,00.html (Jan. 26, 2000) (discussing settlement between the toy company and the 
Internet artists) (on file with the UniVt!rsity of Illinois Law Review). 
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A smear campaign against the trademark owner is a potent defense 
strategy available to domain-name registrants. Shields v. Zuccarim""5 
provides an extreme example of this strategy. In this case, the plaintiff, 
Shields, a famous cartoonist, brought a lawsuit against the defendant, 
Zuccarini, claiming various violations of his intellectual property rights.46 
In response to the lawsuit, the defendant posted a "political protest" on 
the five websites he owned, alleging that plaintiff, in his cartoons, subver­
sively incites kids "to join in the killing and mutilation [of animals].'047 
Furthermore, he p resented himself as the defender of the public who 
would go to great lengths to protect innocent children, this notwithstand­
ing the fact that he registered several sexually explicit domain names.48 
Although Shields ultimately prevailed in court, he, no doubt, suffered a 
reputational harm as a result of his decision to litigate.49 
C. Negotiating a Consensual Transfer 
The third, and final, option available to trademark owners who seek 
to regain control over a domain name is to negotiate a voluntary transfer. 
At first glance, it would appear that disputes over domain names lend 
themselves to Coasean bargaining. There are only two parties involved, 
and the cost of negotiating is low.50 Alas, the existence of just one seller 
and one buyer raises the problem of "bilateral monopoly."51 In bilateral 
monopoly cases, the price of the transaction subject cannot be deter­
mined by reference to the market price or any other external pricing 
mechanism.52 Instead, the price of the transaction depends on the rela­
tive bargaining positions and bargaining skills of the parties to the trans­
action.53 
When the price of the transaction is not readily ascertainable, each 
of the parties to the negotiation will try to capture the lion's share of the 
bargaining surplus by strategically shading her offer. Consider the dis­
pute between Ivan Wong and Morgan Stanley Dean Witter & Co. 
(MSDW) over the domain name <msdwonline.com>. MSDW offered 
Wong $10,000 for the domain name, an offer that struck Wong as ridicu­
lously low."' In his response to the offer, he indicated to MSDW that, in 
his valuation, the coveted domain name is worth hundreds of thousands 
45. 89 F. Supp. 2d 634 (E.D. Pa. 2000). 
46. See id. at 636. 
47. !d. at 635. 
48. See id. at 636. 
49. See id. at 642. 
50. See Cooter, supra note 22, at 17. 
51. See Merges, supra note 22, at 265�. 
52. See Cooter, supra note 22, at 17-18. 
S3. See Merges, supra note 22, at 2660-67. 
S4. See McGeehan & Richtel, supra note l, at Al. 
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of dollars.55 Not surprisingly, the negotiation broke down, and legal ac­
tion ensued. 56 
But which valuation was correct? Which party is to be blamed for 
the impasse? As is the case with all bilateral monopoly situations, there 
is no way to know. The trademark owner is, in most cases, the only pos­
sible buyer of the domain name. Consequently, the price of the domain 
name equals the value the trademark owner assigns to the disputed 
name.S7 Yet, this information is unknown to, and unverifiable by, the 
domain-name holder. The informational conundrum is further compli­
cated by the fact that the trademar.k owner can often use alternative, al­
beit inferior, domain names. For example, MSDW could use the name 
<msonline.com>- instead of <msdwonline.com>-as its domain name. 
Thus, the price of a domain name is essentially the difference between 
the value of the disputed name to the trademark owner and the value of 
the next available alternative.sa But the domain-name registrant cannot 
access this information, and has no way of finding it out. 
In this informational haze, the domain-name holder is highly likely 
to overstate her claim. Two cognitive biases are responsible for this re­
sult. The first is known as the "endowment effect."59 The second is "ex­
cessive optimism" regarding the probability of hoped-for events.150 The 
endowment effect causes persons to overvalue their entitlements. Ac­
cordingly, in the present context, the asking price of the domain-name 
holder will be higher than the objective value of the name. Furthermore, 
the excessive optimism heuristic will prompt the domain-name owner to 
overly discount the probability of a negotiation breakdown. The combi-
55. Seeid. 
56. Suid. 
57. In principle, the domain-name registrant can also try to sell the domain name to the trade­
mark owner's rivals. However, I am not aware of any real world cases involving this strate8)'. 
58. This determination is further complicated by the fact that many of the close substitutes of a 
domain name have often been appropriated as well, and the price of those substitutes may only be 
determined through negotiation with the appropriators. 
59. See generally Daniel Kahneman et al., The Endowmem Elfecl, Loss Aversion, and StaiW 
Quo Bias, 5 J. ECON. PERSP. 193, 194 (1991) (defining the "endowment effect" as a behavior in which 
"peopie often demand much more to g1ve up an object than they wouid be wiiiing to pay to acqUire 
it"); Daniel Kahneman et al., Experimental Tests of the Endowment Effea and lhe Coase Theorem, 98 
J. POL. EcON. 1325 (1990) (concluding that endowment effects are not easily alte.red by experience); 
Richard Thaler, Toward a Positive Theory of Consumer Choice,]. EcoN. BEHAV. & ORG. 1 (1980) 
(examining ways in which consumers deviate rrom rational economic models). On the impact of the 
endowment effect on legal policymaking, see Elizabeth Hoffman & Matthew L. Spitzer, Willingness to 
Pay vs. Willingness to Accept: Legal and Economic Implications, 71 WASH. U. L.Q. 59 (1993); Russell 
Korobkin, Note, Policym��king and the Offer/Asking Price Gap: Toward a Theory of Efficitnt Entitle­
ment Allocation, 46 STAN . L. REV. 663 (1994). 
60. See generally Linda Babcock & George Loewenstein, Explaining Bargaining Impasse: The 
Role of Self-Serving Biases, 11 J. EcoN. PERSP. 109, 119-21 (1997); Daniel Kahneman & Amos Tver­
sky, Conflicl Resolution: A Cognitive Perspecrive, in BARRIERS TO CONFLICT RESOLUTION 44, 46-50 
(Kenneth J. Arrow et al. eds., 1995); Cass Sunstein, Behavioral Analysis of Law, 64 U. CHI. L. REV. 
1175, 1182-83 (1997); Neil D. Weinstein, Unrealistic Optimism about Future Ufe Evtnts, 39 J. 
PERSONALITY & SOC PsYCHOL. 806 (1980). 
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nation of these biases provides a powerful explanation for the frequent 
bargaining failures we witness in this context. 
In sum, none of the three alternatives available to the trademark 
owner adequately addresses her plight. All three alternatives create un­
certainty, implicate considerable costs, and are incapable of resolving the 
underlying dispute in a timely fashion. The failure of conventional legal 
and market mechanisms adequately to resolve disputes over domain 
names necessitates a new approach to the problem. 
III. THE LIMITED EFFECTIVENESS OF EXISTING SOLUTIONS 
The shortcomings of the three alternatives discussed-establishing 
a new domain name, taking legal action, and negotiating a voluntary 
transfer -have led established businesses to seek innovative legal and 
institutional solutions to alleviate their plight. The search has resulted in 
the enactment of two new legal mechanisms: The Anticybersquatting 
Consumer Protection Act (ACPA) of 1999, and ICANN's Rules for Uni­
form Domain Name Dispute Resolution Policy. 
A. The Anticybersquatting Consumer Protection Act 
The ACPA became law on November 29, 1999. It was enacted to 
accomplish three goals: "[1] protect consumers and American busi­
nesses . . .  [2] promote the growth of online commerce, and . . .  [3] pro­
vide clarity . . .  for trademark owners.'�1 The main "evil" targeted by the 
ACPA is the practice of "bad-faith and abusive registration of distinctive 
marks as Internet domain names with the intent to profit from the good­
will associated with such marks -a practice commonly referred to as 'cy­
bersquatting."�2 To contain this practice, the ACPA forbids the bad­
faith registering, trafficking, or use of a domain name identical or confus­
ingly similar to a distinct or famous trademark.63 
The ACP A requires courts to make three determinations. First, the 
court has to determine whether the mark lying at the heart of the dispute 
was distinct or famous at the time the domain name was registered.64 
Second, the court must determine whether the domain name is identical 
61. S. REP. No. 1()6.140, at 4 (1999). 
62 /d. ; see also Sporty's Farm, LL.C. v. Sportsman's Mkt., Inc., 202 F.Jd 489, 495 (2d Cir. 2000). 
63. See S. REP. No. 106-140, at 2 ( 1999). 
64. lS U.S.C.A. § 112S(d)(1)(A)(ii) enables a cause of action against a person who, in bad raith, 
"registers, traffics in, or uses a domain name that" is "identical or confusingly similar to" a mark that is 
(I) "distinctive" or (II) "famous" at the time the domain name is registered. Sub5ection 
1 12S(d)(l)(A)(ii)(III) provides a cause of action in two limited situations. Under this subsection, a 
suit can be brought against a person who registers a domain name that is "a trademark, word, or name 
protected by" 18 U.S.C. § 706 (protecting the sign of the Red Cross), or 36 U.S.C. § 220506 (protecting 
the name, symbol, emblem and words associated with the "United States Olympic Committee"). 15 
U.S.C.A. § 112S(d)(l)(A)(ii) (West Supp. 2000). 
No. 1] TRADEMARKS, DOMAIN NAMES & AUCfiONS 22S 
or confusingly similar to the mark." Finally, the court must decide 
whether the domain-name registrant acted in bad faith, with an intent to 
commercially exploit the similarity between the domain name and the 
mark.66 
Of these three determinations the last one is clearly the hardest. 
Bad faith and intent are subjective motivations unknown to external ob­
servers. Thus, to facilitate the task somewhat, the act lists nine factors to 
be considered by the court when determining the intent of domain-name 
registrants. These factors include: (1) the intellectual property of the 
registrant in the disputed name; (2) the personal and legal affiliation of 
the registrant to the name; (3) prior use of the name by the registrant in 
connection with goods and services; ( 4) the registrant's bona fide non­
commercial or fair use of the mark ·in her site; (5) the registrant's intent 
to subvert the business of the trademark owner; (6) attempts by the reg­
istrant to transfer the name for fmancial gain; (7) provision of misleading 
contact information by the registrant at the time of registration; (8) 
"warehousing" by the registrant; and (9) the degree of distinctiveness of 
the disputed mark.67 However, the act then states that no bad faith 
should be found if the registrant "believed, and had reasonable grounds 
to believe that the use of the domain name was a fair use or otherwise 
Ia wful. "68 
If bad faith on the part of the domain-name registrant is established, 
the court "may order the forfeiture or cancellation of the domain name 
or the transfer of the domain name to the owner of the mark.'t69 In addi­
tion, the court has discretion to award the trademark owner up to 
$100,000 in statutory damages per each domain name found to be in in­
fringement of the mark.70 
B. The Rules for Uniform Domain Name Dispute Resolution Policy 
An alternative recourse available to a trademark owner is arbitra­
tion under the Uniform Domain Name Dispute Resolution Policy.71 The 
UDRP was adopted by ICANN on August 26, 1999, and is binding upon 
all ICANN-approved registrars, who must accept the UDRP to receive 
6S. See 15 U.S.C.A. § 1 12S(d)(l)(A)(ii)(I)-{II). 
66. See id. § 112S(d)(1)(A)(i). 
67. See id. § 1 12S(d)(l)(B)(i). 
68. /d. § 1125(d)(l)(B)(ii). 
69. /d. § 1 125(d)(1)(q. 
70. /d. § 11 17(d). The statutory damages serve two purposes. First, they ensure that the trade­
mark owner receives jll5t compensation !or the loss she suffered Second, they serve a deterrent effecL 
The threat of losing $100,000 may induce domain-name registrants, especially risk averse ones, to set­
tle cases rather than litigate them until the end. 
71. See UORP, supra note 14. To implement UORP, ICANN adopted The Rules for Uniform 
Domain Name Dispute Resolution Policy (RUORP), which establish the procedural rules of dispute 
re11olution under UORP. See ICANN, Rules for Umform Domain Name Dispute Resolution Policy, al 
http://www.icann.org/udrpludrp-rules-24oct99.htm (last updated Jan. 3, 2000) (on file with the Univer­
sity of /llillois Law Review). 
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accreditation.72 Under the UDRP, disputes concerning domain names 
are submitted to an ICANN-approved dispute-resolution service pro­
vider/3 who appoints an "Administrative Panel" to determine the respec­
tive rights of the parties to the disputed name. 
Although primarily enacted to address cybersquatting, the UDRP 
does not define cybersquatting; instead, it describes the types of disputes 
to which it applies. Paragraph 4(a) of the UDRP defines "Applicable 
Disputes" as disputes in which the respondent: (1) registered a domain 
name identical or confusingly similar to the complainant's trademark or 
service mark; (2) has no legitimate interests in the domain name; and (3) 
appropriated and used the domain name in "bad faith. "74 These ele­
ments are cumulative, and thus the complainant-trademark owner must 
prove that all three are present for the UDRP to apply.7s 
The UDRP then lists four factors that may support a bad-faith find­
ing. Paragraph 4(b) provides that bad faith shall be inferred if the re­
spondent domain-name owner: {1) has appropriated the domain name 
primarily to extract consideration from the trademark owner, or her 
competitor, in exchange for its transfer; (2) has repeatedly registered 
domain names to bar trademark owners from using their marks as their 
domain name; (3) has registered the domain name primarily for the pur­
pose of disrupting the business of a competitor; or (4) has intentionally 
attempted to free-ride on the trademark owner's goodwill by attracting 
confused consumers to her site.76 However, the UDRP then states that 
demonstrable preparation to use a domain name in connection with a 
bona fide offering of goods or services could defeat a bad-faith allega­
tion.77 
As for remedies, in the case of a ruling for the trademark owner, the 
appointed panel may order the cancellation of the disputed domain 
name, or that the domain name be transferred to the trademark owner.78 
C. The Misguided Reliance on Good Faith 
Although both the ACPA and the UDRP are steps in the right di­
rection, neither of them ultimately provides a satisfactory framework for 
72 See ICANN, Resolutions Approved by rhe Board Santiago Meeting, Aug. 26, 1999, ar 
http://www.icann.org/santiago/santiago-resolutions.htm (last updated Aug. 28, 1999) (on file with the 
University of /llinois Law Review). By March 2000, ICANN had accredited more than 90 registrars. 
See Mitchell-Stephens, supra note 30, at l.v. 
73. See UDRP. supra note 14, U 4-4(a). So far, ICANN approved four dispute resolution pro­
viders: WIPO, the CPR Institute for Dispute Resolution, eResolution, and the National Arbitration 
Forum. See ICANN Approved Providers List, at http://www.icann.org/udrp/approved-providers.htm 
(page updated Oct. l7, 2000) (on file with the University of Illinois lAw Review). 
74. UDRP, supra note 14, 'f 4(a). 
15. See id. 
76. See id. 'f 4(b). 
77. See id. 'I 4(c). 
78. See id. If 4(i). 
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resolving disputes between domain name and trademark owners. Both 
solutions are vague, time consuming, and worse, neither of them guaran­
tees efficient allocation of resources. In both cases, these Daws are at­
tributable to one cause: reliance on the "good-faith" standard. Both the 
ACPA and the UDRP focus on the good, or bad, faith of the domain­
name registrant in determining the entitlement to the domain name. 
Good faith, however, is a notoriously fuzzy determinant, unobservable to 
third parties. To overcome this problem, both the ACPA and the UDRP 
focus on various external indications that undermine or support good 
faith. But this strategy fails to carry the day. 
Consider the ACP A, first. It lists nine factors to be considered. by 
the courts in determining good faith. This enumeration is a perfect ex­
ample of the adage "more is less." As is often the case with multifactor 
lists, the factors enumerated are highly likely to conDict with one another 
in particular cases. For example, how should a court decide a case in 
which the domain-name registrant "warehoused" multiple domain 
names, yet, the particular name at the heart of the dispute represents her 
last name? Which factor should be given more weight, if all the other 
factors are moot? One can think of many other examples, involving any 
number of factors pulling in opposite directions. Yet, the act provides no 
guidance as to how such conflicts should be resolved. To muddy the wa­
ters further, after listing the nine factors courts must consider in deter­
mining bad faith, the ACPA states that no bad faith should be found if 
the registrant "believed and had reasonable grounds to believe that the 
use of the domain name was a fair use or otherwise lawful. "79 The bal­
ancing test, in which the ACPA requires courts to engage, makes it very 
difficult for the parties to determine their respective entitlements to the 
domain name ex ante, forcing them to rely on adjudication as the pri­
mary means of ascertaining their rights. 
The UDRP fares only marginally better on this count. Although 
the UDRP contains a shorter list of external factors attesting to the in­
tent of the domain-name registrant, the four-factor list it provides does 
not escape the problem of internal conDicts. For example, it is impossi­
ble to discern whether a registrant who registered her legal name did so 
to s11bvert the trademark owner's husines.s, or for another, legitimate 
purpose. Consider again the hypothetical example of Charlie Klein who 
registers the domain name <ck.com>. Charlie's motivation might be be­
nign or subversive - or most likely a combination of the two - but unless 
Charlie openly admits his motivation, it is impossible to discern his true 
motivation. Furthermore, under the UDRP, demonstrable preparation 
to use the name in trade creates a good-faith presumption. Although this 
provision clearly protects the reliance interest of the domain-name regis­
trant, it is unclear how much reliance is necessary for the presumption to 
79. 15 U.S.C.A. § U2S(d)(l)(B)(ii) (West Supp. 2000). 
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arise. If very minimal preparation suffices, then any bad-faith allegation 
may be easily defeated. If the necessary reliance is more substantial, the 
UDRP induces wasteful reliance expenditures by domain-name regis­
trants whose rights may be contested. 
A second shortcoming of the ACPA and the UDRP is their inability 
to resolve disputes instantaneously. Both litigation and arbitration are 
time-consuming. The longer a domain name remains in the hands of the 
registrant, the greater the harm to the trademark owner, as well as to in­
nocent Web-surfers who seek to reach the trademark owner's site. 
Moreover, the wait implicated by the ACPA and UDRP puts the trade­
mark owner in a "commercial limbo." As long as the resolution process 
is in progress, the trademark owner cannot use . the disputed name, but 
investing in a new name may prove wasteful should the disputed name be 
eventually restored to her. Worse yet, during this period, the trademark 
owner will lose sales to competitors whose domain names are identical to 
their marks. 
Finally, and most importantly, due to their reliance on the good­
faith standard neither the ACPA nor the UDRP guarantees an economi­
cally efficient allocation of domain names. Economic efficiency seeks to 
place assets in the hands of their highest value users at the least possible 
cost. From an efficiency standpoint, a domain name, like any other re­
source, should be allocated to the party who values it the most. Accord­
ingly, in disputes over domain names, economic efficiency prescribes that 
the name be granted to the party who places a higher value on the name. 
Yet, because the good-faith standard focuses exclusively on the intent of 
the registrant, it completely disregards efficiency concerns. Assume that 
Irene, Bob, and Martha decide to launch an on-line music portal. For 
want of a better name, or at least so they allege, they register the domain 
name <IBM.com>. Clearly, the value of the domain name <IBM.com> 
to Irene, Bob, and Martha is a tiny fraction of its worth to IBM. Hence, 
depriving mM of the right to use its trademark as its domain name is in­
efficient. Moreover, it is inequitable; after all, IBM invested enormous 
amounts of money in establishing its brand name and goodwill, and al­
lowing the domain-name registrant to "free ride" on this investment is 
outright unjust. Yet, if Irene, Bob, and Martha registered the domain 
name first, mM would find relief neither in the ACP A nor in the 
UDRP.80 Fortunately for IBM it controls the domain name <IBM.com>. 
But other established businesses that were not so lucky will discover that 
the existing legal solutions do not adequately protect them against so­
phisticated domain name "hijackers." Under both existing dispute­
resolution mechanisms, the fact that the domain name is much more 
80. Of course, IBM could uy to buy back the domain name from Irene, Bob, and Martha, but Cor 
the reasons explained in supra Part Il.C., postregistration negotiation is not a very promising option in 
the present context. 
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valuable to the trademark owner is irrelevant to the determination of the 
relative rights of the parties. 81 
· 
On top of it all, the solutions employed by the ACPA and UDRP 
are also problematic on fairness grounds. Both the ACPA and UDRP 
rest on the principle of property rule protection.82 Under both, either the 
domain-name registrant gets to retain the name, and the trademark 
owner gets nothing; or, the trademark owner gets the domain name and 
the domain-name registrant receives nothing.83 In other words, both so­
lutions ·rely on a binary, all or nothing, regime, with the loser receiving no 
compensation.84 This, however, seems inequitable, given that both the 
trademark owner and the domain-name registrant who uses the name in 
trade independently contribute to the value of the domain name. Thus, a 
liability rule regime that entitles the losing party to some sort of compen­
sation would effect a more equitable result. · 
The shortcomings of the existing legal solutions call for an alterna­
tive resolution mechanism. In the next part, I will show that auction the­
ory holds a superior solution to the challenge of domain name allocation, 
one that avoids the pitfalls of the good-faith standard ·and is compatible 
with the nature of e-commerce. 
IV. AN AUCfiONING METHOD FOR REALLOCATING DOMAIN NAMES 
Auctions are "stylized markets with well-defined rules. "85 For this 
reason, auctions provide an effective vehicle for overcoming the problem 
of asymmetric information. Properly designed, the auctioning process 
.can induce auction participants to reveal their true valuations of the auc-
81. A recent dispute involving the celebrated artist "Sting" is a case in point. In a recent arbitra­
tion proceeding, Sting was deprived of the right to use his stage name as his domain name, after Mi­
chael Urvan, from Marietta, Georgia, registered the name c:sting.com> as the domain name of his 
gambling site. The WJPO arbitration panel ruled that Sting failed to show bad faith on the part of 
Urvan. See Sumner v. Urvan. No. 02000-0596 (WJPO Arbitration and Mediation Center, Administra­
tive Panel Decision, July 24, 2000), available at http:l/www.sting.com/WIPO_Decision.asp (on file with 
the University of Illinois LAw Review). 
82. See Guido Calabresi &. A. Douglas Melamed, Property Rules, Liability Rules and Inalienabil­
ity: One View of the Cathed,rnl. 85 HA!!V. L. ll..EV. 10!!9, 1002 (1972). Umkr the Calabteai­
Melarnedian framework, property-rule protection forces potential "taltersM lo secure the consent of 
the entitlement owner, and thus, allows her to determine the price of her entitlement. Liability-rule 
protection, by contrast, allows potential "takers" to avail themselves of or:her people's entitlements as 
long as they are willing to pay a collectively determined price that is usually set by a court, a legislator, 
or an administrative agency. See UJ. 
83. lf the losing party wishes to buy the domain name back, she wiU have to pay the asking price 
of the winner. 
84. The ACPA empowers the court to order the cancellation or transfer of the disputed domain 
name. [n addition, it authorizes the court to award, at its discretion, between $10,000 and $100,000, in 
statutory damages, and attorney's fees to the prevailing party. The remedies under the ICANN's 
UDRP are limited to cancellation and transfer; no damages or attorney's fees can be awarded. See 
Richard J. Grabowski, Adventures in Cyberspace, Strntegies for Securing and Protecting Your Firm's 
Domain Name, 17 No. 1 1  LEGAL TECH. NEWSL 7 (2000). 
85. ERIC RASMUSEN, GAMES AND INFORMATION: AN INTRODUCOON TO GAME THEORY 293 
(2d ed. 1994). 
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tion object, and thereby ensure efficient allocation of resources. This 
ability makes auctions especially attractive in thin market settings, in 
which prices are not readily ascertainable. Given the lack of a natural 
market for domain names, and that postregistration bargaining raises the 
problem of bilateral monopoly, the application of auction theory to dis­
putes over domain names is especially fitting. The remainder of this part 
is divided into two sections. In section A, I will introduce and explain the 
auction concepts that are relevant to my recommended proposal. Then, 
in section B ,  I will construct an auctioning mechanism that effectively re­
solves disputes over domain names. 
A. Terminology and Typology 
Auctions are amenable to several classifications,86 four of which are 
important for the purpose of this essay. First,. auctions can be classified 
by the way the value of the auctioned object is determined.87 According · 
to this classification auctions come in three varieties: private-value auc­
tions, common-value auctions, and correlated-value auctions.88 In a pri­
vate-value auction, each bidder knows precisely how much she values the 
auctioned obj ect, and her valuation does not depend on those of other 
bidders.89 A bidder's valuation would be unaffected by learning of other 
bidders' valuations. An example of a private-value auction is an art auc­
tion in which the buyers intend never to resell.90 In a common-value auc­
tion, by contrast, the "objective" value of the object is identical for all 
bidders, but the valuations of the bidders differ as they reflect the private 
information available to each bidder.91 An example of a common-value 
auction is bidding on an oil lease. The value of the lease depends on the 
amount of oil in the reservoir. Each bidder has an estimate as to what 
that amount might be. Yet, this estimate may change in response to in­
formational signals from other bidders. Finally, in a correlated-value 
auction, the valuations of the bidders are correlated, but the values they 
ascribe to the auctioned object may differ.92 As a practical matter, all 
auctions in the real world are correlated-value.93 
A second way to classify auctions is procedural, that is, by the way 
the bidding process occurs. This classification breaks up auctions into 
86. For a general discussion, see id. at 293-95; Paul Klemperer, Auction Theory: A Guide to the 
Literature, 13 1. ECON. SURV. 227, 331-36 (1999). 
87. See RASMUSEN, supra note 85, at 293-94. 
88. See id. 
89. See id. at 294. 
90. As Rasmusen points out, "{i)f there were resale, a bidder's valuation would depend on the 
price at which he could resell, which would depend on other players valuations." /d. 
91. See id. ; Klemperer, supra note 86, at 231. 
92. See RAsMUS EN, supra note 85, at 294. 
93. The common-value auction is a considered a special case of a correlated-value auction. 
Thus, the existence of common-value auctions does not undermine the accuracy of the observation. 
See id. 
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two general types: open-bid auctions and sealed-bid auctions.94 In an 
open-bid auction, the bidders announce their bids publicly.95 The typical 
example of an open-bid auction is an oral auction. The · open bidding 
provides bidders with updated information about their peers' valuations, 
enabling each bidder to react to this information by adjusting her bid. In 
a sealed-bid auction, each bidder has only one chance to bid and revise 
the bid amount in response to the bids of others.96 Accordingly, the in­
formational basis of the bidders in a sealed-bid auction is different from 
that of  the bidders in an open auction. 
A third way to classify auctions is by the price the winner of the auc­
tion has to pay.97 This classification applies only to sealed-bid auctions, 
dividing them into first-price, and second-price auctions. In a first-price, 
sealed-bid auction, the highest bidder wins the auction and pays her ac­
tual bid. Thus, her best strategy is to try an outbid by the smallest mar­
gin possible the second highest bidder. In a second-price, sealed-bid auc­
tion, also known a "Vickrey auction,"98 the highest bidder wins the 
auction but pays the second highest bid. In this type of auction, a bid­
der's best strategy is to bid her true valuation because the price she might 
eventually pay does not depend on her bid; the bid only determines who 
wins the auction.119 Thus, a Vickrey auction eliminates the incentive to 
bid strategically, and induces truthful bidding. 
Finally, it is useful to distinguish between "standard auctions" and 
"internal auctions .. " In a standard auction, a seller auctions off an object, 
and a group of buyers competes for the right to buy it.100 In· principle, 
any person can bid on the auctioned object, with the highest bidder re­
ceiving the object if her bid exceeds the asking price. The roles of 
"seller" and "buyer" are predefined and immutable. In an internal auc­
tion, by contrast, the group of participants is limited to persons who have 
a stake in, or a potential entitlement to, the auction object. For example, 
the group of eligible participants may be comprised of the partners in a 
partnership that is about to be dissolved and sold;101 a polluter and a 
94. See id. at 294-98 (dividing auctions by four different rule sets: ( 1 )  English (first-price, open-
cry); (2) First-price, sealed-bid; (3) Vickery (second-price, sealed-bid); and (4) Dutch (descen<l!ng)). 
95. S� KJ;:mperilr, iiUpru iiUie 80, at 2Ji-32. 
96. See id. at 232. 
97. See RASMUSEN, supra note 85, at 295-97 (distinguishing between first-price, open-cry and 
sealed-bid auctions and second-price, sealed or "Vickery" bids); see also Klemperer, supra note 86, at 
232-33. 
98. William Vickrey, after whom the second-price, sealed-bid auction is called, has been one of 
the pioneers of the theoretical study of auctions. His article, CoiUIIenpeculation, Auctiom, and Com· 
petilive Se4led Tenders, is considered a classic. William Vickrey, CoU111enpeculati01l, Auctiom, and 
Competitive Sealed Tenders, 16 J. FrN. 8 (1961). 
99. It is important to note that there is no dominant bidding strategy in a sealed-bid, first-price 
auction. See R. Preston McAfee & John McMillan, Auctions and Bidding, 25 J. ECON. LJTERATIJRE 
699, 708 (1987). 
100. See id. at 701-03. 
101. See Peter Cramton et al., Dissolving a Parrnenhip Efficiemly, 55 ECONOMETRICA 615, 615 
(1987). 
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nearby neighbor who seeks to enjoin the pollution;102 and a domain-name 
appropriator and a trademark owner who claims the name. Further­
more, because all participants have some claim to the auctioned object, it 
is unclear, ex ante, who the buyer is and who the seller is. Initially, each 
participant is both a potential buyer and a potential seller, and only at 
the end of the auction does it become clear who sells and who buys. At 
that point, the winner of the auction gains an unqualified entitlement to 
the auctioned object, free of any claims from other auction partici­
pants.103 
B. The Mechanism Design 
To qualify for the auction, a domain-name owner will have to satisfy 
two prerequisites. First, she will have to show that she bas registered not 
more than three domain names.104 Second, she will have to show that she 
is actually using the name in e-cornmerce.105 These preliminary require­
ments are designed to screen out "warehousers" and other free riders 
who appropriate domain names for the sole purpose of selling them back 
to trademark owners. Such transfers do not create any new social value; 
on the contrary, they impose a cost on society by impeding commerce 
and fomenting litigation. Thus, nonproductive uses of domain names 
should be discouraged. Only domain-name registrants who use the name 
in e-cornmerce, and thereby put the domain name to a productive use, 
should be entitled to bid on the domain name. In all other cases, the 
domain name should simply be returned to the trademark owner at no 
cost.Ulti 
Once the pool of the legitimate domain owners has been estab­
lished, a trademark owner seeking to reclaim a domain name would be 
entitled to force the domain-name owner into a sealed-bid bilateral auc-
102 See Ian Ayres & J. M. Ballda, Legal Emitlemenrs as Auctions: Propmy Rulu, UabiJiJy 
Rules, and Beyond, 106 YALE L.J. 703, 700-16 (1996). 
103. For discussion of the pote11ti� effic;iellcy etfe� of 1\uctioiiS with�>ut pn-4"fin!M '!t'llen, se� 
WiJJWn Samuelson, A Cammml on the Cout TM<m:m, ill GAME· THEORETIC MoDELS OF 
BARGAINING 321, 325-31 (Alvin E. Roth ed., 1985). Samuelson posits that preassigning the entitle­
ment to any bidder may adversely affect the efficient allocation of resources, and proposes instead a 
mechanism in which the bidders are "joint owners of the right." /d. at 331. 
104. The purpose of the limitation is to ensure the exclusion of warehousers. Exceptions should 
be made in cases involving a larger number of related domsin names, for example, variations on the 
same name. Admittedly, the proposed number (three) is arbitrary, and thus the auction administrator 
should be granted discretion to deviate from this rule in appropriate cases. 
105. Naturally, the first requirement should be modified in cases involving a domain-name regi$­
trant with several businesses. In such cases, the rule should be one domain name per business. 
106. To be sure, one could argue that the trademark owner who receives the domain name should 
reimburse the domsin-name registrant for the registration fees -currently $70 for two years. How­
ever, to deter the practice of warehousing, no reimbursement should be granted in this case. In fact, it 
may even be necessary to impose a somewhat greater penalty on warehousers to discourage them from 
engaging in this activity. 
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tion,107 in which the name would be auctioned off between the parties.108 
The auctioning process should proceed in accordance with the following 
rules: . 
(a) Each bidder will post a bond in the amount of her bid. 
· (b) If the trademark owner submits the higher bid, she will get 
the domain name for a price equal to the bid of the domain-name 
registrant. . 
(c) If; by contrast, the domain-name owner submits a bid equal 
to, or higher than the bid of the trademark owner, she will retain 
the domain name but she will have to pay the amount of her bid to 
the trademark owner. 
(d) At the end of the auction, the domain name will become inal­
ienable for a period of two years. 
The proposed mechanism rests on the assumption that the domain 
name is considerably more valuable to the trademark owner than it is to 
the domain-na.me registrant.109 Furthermore, it presupposes that the do- · 
main-name registrant, as a self-interest maximizer, will seek to exploit 
the considerable disparity in value by trying to appropriate the lion's 
share of the difference in value. Although the average trademark owner 
will treat the auction as a "private-value auction," the domain-name reg­
istrant will view the auction as a "correlated-value auction." And, al­
though generally the distribution of the bargaining surplus between the 
parties is not a concern per se, if the domain-name registrant mistakenly 
overplays h�r hand and ou�bids the trademark owner, efficiency will be 
harmed. To counter this possibility, the mechanism design subjects the 
parties to different bidding rules. The result is an asymmetric bilateral 
auction. 
Rule (a) is intended to assure the parties' ability to pay the amounts 
they bid; This concern is particularly pertinent in the case of the· domain­
name registrant who will exaggerate her bid in the absence of a bond re­
quirement. Without a bond requirement, the domain-name registrant 
could bid any amount, and then, if the outcome of the auction were not 
to her liking, claim that she cannot afford to pay.1 10 The bond require-
107. Although in principle the proposed mechani!lm is readily applicable to disputes of this lrind, I 
believe that it should not be made available to trademark owners whose marks were established after 
the registration of an identical or confusingly similar domain name. This is because such trademark 
owners could have easily found out of the existence of the domain-name registrant by running a very 
simple search, and are, thus, the least cost avoiders. For this reason, it is quite unlikely that disputes of 
this kind will actually arise. 
108. Procedurally, the auctioning process can be administered by any of ICANN's accredited do­
main-name registrars. The trademark owner initiating the process will notify the challenged domain­
name registrant and the relevant administrator of the impending challenge, and the auction can be 
held shortly thereafter. 
109. I revisit this assumption i.nfro Part IV.C. There, I add the assumption that the domain-name 
registrant may in fact be the higher-value user, and modify the auctioning mechanism to account for 
this possibility. 
1 10. A different way to overcome the inability to pay problem is to provide that inability to pay 
would result in automatic forfeiture of the domain name, and its transfer to the other party. 
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ment alleviates this concern, and thus, lends credibility to the bidding 
process. Furthermore, the bond requirement may force many domain 
name appropriators to seek external validation of the valuations prior to 
bidding. Given that the amounts involved are quite considerable, many 
domain-name owners would have to borrow money from financial insti­
tutions to satisfy the bond requirement. This, in turn, would provide 
them with the opportunity to consult financial experts about the value of 
the name. 
Rule (b) is crafted to induce the trademark owner to bid truthfully. 
Effectively, this rule turns the auction into a Vickery auction for the 
trademark owner, thereby guaranteeing her that her bid will have no ef­
fect on the price she pays if she wins. In the case of domain names, the 
efficient allocation of resources may be thwarted either because the do­
main-name owner strategically overrepresents her valuation, out of hope 
of winning a disproportionate share of the bargaining surplus, or because 
the trademark owner strategically underrepresents her valuation out of 
fear of surrendering too much of the bargaining surplus. Rules (a) and 
(c) intend to deal with the former risk; rule (b) is designed to deal with 
the latter. Because in a Vickery auction the winner does not pay the 
amount she bid but rather the second highest amount, the trademark 
owner's dominant strategy is to bid her true valuation, and, in the likely 
case of a victory, pay the bid amount of the domain-name owner. Ac­
cordingly, if Tammy, the trademark owner, bid $100,000 (her true valua­
tion), and Diana, the domain-name registrant, bid $30,000, then Tammy 
will get the domain name for the price of $30,000. 
Rule (c) aims at further restraining the ability of the domain-name 
registrant to bid strategically. Although the bond requirement forces the 
domain-name registrant to put her money where her bid is, it only par­
tially restrains the ability of the domain-name owner to bid strategically. 
After all, if the domain-name owner believes that there is a substantial 
disparity in value between the parties, she will overrepresent her valua­
tion to increase her payoff notwithstanding the bond requirement. While 
designing the auction as a Vickery auction for the trademark owner en­
sured truthful bidding by her, a similar tactic will not work for the do­
main-name registrant simply because the domain-name owner knows she 
is extremely unlikely to win. The goal of the domain-name registrant is 
not to try and win the auction, but rather to extract as high a payoff as 
possible by bidding strategically. Her bidding strategy will be to bid in­
crementally below the trademark owner. To execute this strategy, the 
domain-name owner needs to estimate accurately the valuation of the 
trademark owner. However, because the bidding process is conducted 
under imperfect information and the valuation of the trademark owner is 
unobservable private knowledge, the domain-name owner may overes­
timate the value of the name to the trademark owner and bid too high. 
Thus, this bidding strategy runs the risk of distorting alJocative efficiency. 
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Rule (c), in combination with rule (d), counters the domain-name 
registrant's disposition to shade up her bid by introducing a "winner's 
curse" into the auction.111  Unless the domain-name registrant really val­
ues the name more highly, overbidding will result in her overpaying for a 
name she would be happy to sell to the trademark owner. The fear of 
having to pay the exaggerated bid in the case of a victory restrains the 
motivation of the domain-name owner to overbid. Admittedly, rule (c) 
will not induce the domain-name registrant to bid her private valua­
tion - indeed, given that for the domain-name registrant this is a corre­
lated value auction, there is no reason why she should.112· Importantly, 
however, it practically eliminates the risk of the domain-name owner 
mistakenly winning the auction. 
To see this, consider the following example. Assume that Diana's 
private valuation of the domain name she owns is $10,000. She estimates 
that Tammy's valuation of the name ranges between $31 ,000 and 
$100,000, with equal distribution. Assuming risk neutrality and random 
drawing, and given rule (c), Diana's best strategy is to bid $30,000, the 
amount that promises her the highest expected payoff;113 bidding a higher 
amount runs the risk of winning the auction, and thus, diminishes the ex­
pected payoff. If Diana is risk averse, the amount of her bid would be 
even lower.114 
It is possible, of course, that the domain-name registrant would win 
the auction not because she mistakenly overbid, but, simply, because she 
is the higher-value user. In this case, awarding the domain name is the 
efficient outcome, and the price she pays would compensate the trade­
mark owner for the latter's contribution to the value of the name. 
Finally, rule (d) preserves the integrity of the auction by rendering 
the domain name inalienable for two years at the conclusion of the auc­
tion.m Without this rule, the domain-name holder could risk an unfa­
vorable outcome at the auction, and rely on post-auction negotiations to 
secure a more propitious result. For example, if post-auction negotiation 
were possible, Diana could bid $99,000, win the auction, and then, try to 
sell the domain name to Tammy for $50,000. Rule {d) eliminates this 
i i 1. As i expiain beiow, the "winner's curse� is magnified by ruie (a), which renders the outcome 
of the auction immutable for a period of two years. 
1 12. However, the inability to force the domain-name holder to bid her private valuation reduces 
the incentive of the trademark owner to invest in the mark. In other words, the need to buy back do· 
main names will lead trademark owners to invest less in their mark than they would otherwise. 
113. I assume for the sake of simplicity that the bids must be in increments of one thousand. 
1 14. The assumption of risk aversion is reasonable because only domain-name owners who use 
the name in commerce are eligible to bid (warehousers are excluded at the preliminary stage). The 
exclusion of warehousers implies that the domain-name registrants who qualify cannot effectively di· 
versify away the risk of winning tbe auction, i.e., overpaying for the right to keep using the domain 
name. 
1 15. ln a similar vein, Ian Ayres and Kristen Madison pointed out that an inalienability restriction 
can be used to combat strategic threats of inefficient performance i n  contractual settings. See Ian 
Ayres & Kristen Madison, Threatening lnefficielll Performance of Injunctions and Contracts, 148 U. 
PA. L. REV. 45, 54-56 ( 1999). 
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strategy. The inability to transfer the domain name outside of the auc­
tion ensures the effectiveness of rules (a) through (c). Naturally, it also 
eliminates the prospect of additional transaction costs. 
However, rule (d) does not render the domain name inalienable in 
perpetuity; it limits the inalienability period to two years. The two-year 
period is sufficiently long to deter excessive greediness on the part of the 
domain-name holder, yet it allows for the possibility that in the future 
the relative values of the parties may change sufficiently to warrant a dif­
ferent outcome.U6 It is possible, for example, that two years after the 
auction, the business of the domain name's registrant will surpass the 
value of the trademark owner's business, and the former would like to 
buy the name back. In such a case, a second auction should be adminis­
tered, but the rules should be changed to reflect the new reality.111 
In sum, the asymmetric internal auction I propose overcomes the 
problem of bilateral monopoly and promotes efficient allocation of re­
sources. Furthermore, it accomplishes this at a minimal administrative 
cost: the auction consists of a single iteration after which bargaining is 
temporarily prohibited.118 The key to the effectiveness of the proposed 
mechanism lies in the utilization of asymmetric bidding rules, which dis­
incentivizes strategic posturing, and induces the parties to strike a Pareto 
optimal deal: the winner gets the domain name, and the loser receives an 
amount in excess of her private valuation of the asset.119 
116. Admittedly, the two-year inalienabilily period is somewhat arbitrary. The inalienability pe· 
riod may be shorter (e.g., one year) or longer (e.g., three years), so long as it effectively deten exces­
sive greediness on the pan of domain-name holders, while allowing for change in the relative value of 
the domain name to the panies. 
117. Because the second auction occurs in very different circumstances, I propose that the right 
mechanism design is a symmetric Vickery auction. However, if the trademark owner wins the auction, 
he should get the domain name for free. This is necessary because the domain-name owner may re· 
quest a seoond auction only to get back at the trademark owner for depriving ber of the name in the 
first auction. 
118. These are the two advantages of my mechanism over that of Ayres and Balkin. Ayres and 
Balkin derive their mechanism from the possibility of reciprocal takings. They posit that liability rules 
can be viewed as truncated auctions. Based on this insight, they construct an auction mechanism for 
allocating entitlements. Under their mechanism, the panics to a dispute are to enter a multistage in­
ternal auction, in which each pany can raise her bid incrementlllly tQ surpass th.e bid of the other p�!'fy. 
The party who made the last bid, te., the highcsl bidder, wins the auction and gets the entitlement. 
Su Ayres & Balkin, supra note 102, at 707-16. Ant. because Ayres and Balkin's mechanism requires 
multiple reiterations it is more costly and time-consuming than the mechanism I propose. This is es­
pecially true if the bidding panies can take some time off between rounds to reassess their bidding 
strategies. As I already noted, expeditious resolution of disputes over domain names is panicularly 
important because such disputes adversely affect innocent third parties, i.e., CO!lllumers and Web sud­
ers. Second, because Ayres and Balkin do not require that the entitlement become inalienable at the 
end of the auction, their mechanism is prone to abuse in the present context. A pany can intentionally 
overbid and then rectify the unfavorable result through post-auction negotiation. Importantly, the 
overbidding party will know after the auction stage the valuation of the other bidder and will thus be 
able to appropriate the entire bargaining surplus. 
119. Recall that if the trademark owner loses she receives the bid of the domain-name holder, 
which is higher than what she bid. If, on the other hand, the domain-name registrant loses, her payoff 
will be higher than her private valuation of the name for the reasons explained above. See supra text 
accompanying notes 1 10-12. 
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Before concluding, I would like to address two potential challenges. 
One might question the necessity of an auction and propose, instead, that 
a superior way to attain efficient allocation of resources is simply to 
award the name to the trademark owner without even holding an auc­
tion. Because I assume that, on average, the trademark owner values the 
domain name more highly, granting her the entitlement will, on average, 
promote economic efficiency. This argument is flawed in three impor­
tant respects. First, in some cases the domain-name holder's valuation 
may be higher than that of the trademark owner. In such instances, effi­
ciency requires that the domain name be allocated to the domain-name 
holder. However, without an auction it is impossible to ascertain the true 
valuations of the parties. Second, if the trademark owner does not have 
to pay for the name, too many forced takings would occur. Exempted 
from the need to compensate, trademark owners will take domain names 
remotely similar to their mark and may even abuse their prerogative to 
quash smaller competitors. For example, under a rule that does not re­
quire compensation, Apple Computer will probably take all the domain 
names that incorporate the term "apple" because doing so is costless.120 
The compensation requirement forces the trademark owner to internal­
ize the costs t}lat she would otherwise externalize on others. Finally, and 
perhaps most importantly, an uncompensated transfer of the domain 
name to the trademark owner probably violates the Takings Clause of 
the Fifth Amendment, and, therefore, is likely to be unconstitutional. 
The second challenge to my solution concerns the wisdom of pro­
posing an ex post rather than an ex ante solution to the problem of con­
flicting claims to domain names. The auction mechanism I construct in 
this subsection is a remedial measure, operating ex post to resolve dis­
putes over domain names after they arise. One might object that a better 
solution to the problem may be to address the problem ex ante by de­
signing a better registration process that will avoid the problem alto­
gether. For example, trademark owners could have been awarded an 
automatic right to use their marks as their domain names, and no one 
else could register them. I focus on an ex post solution for two reasons. 
First, the cost of administering a registration process that would avoid 
disputes between trademark owners and domain-name registrants i!i 
likely to be prohibitive. To begin with, there is no comprehensive regis­
try of all existing trademarks. Also, one has to bear in mind that even if 
trademark owners were given a preemptive right to register their marks 
as their domain names, confusingly similar names could still be regis­
tered. Second, and more importantly, the opportunity to adopt a better 
registration system is long lost. Millions of domain names have been reg­
istered under the less than perfect registration system currently in place. 
120. See Jessica Utman, The DNS Wars: Trademarks and tile Internet Domain Name Syscem, 4 J. 
SMALL & EMERGING BUS. L. 149, 1.53 (2.000) (discussing the problem of allocating domain names to 
trademark owners whose marks are identical or similar, e.g., Apple Computer and Apple Records). 
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This system, on account of its imperfections, has engendered a slew of 
disputes over domain names, and these disputes must be resolved. Thus, 
any ex ante measure must be supplemented by an ex post measure to re­
solve existing disputes. 
C. Variants 
So far, I have assumed that the trademark owner values the dis� 
puted name more highly than the domain-name registrant; or, put differ� 
ently, that the value of the trademark owner's business exceeds that of 
the domain-name registrant's business.121 However, in the Internet 
economy this will not always be true. The assumption that established, 
traditional businesses are necessarily more worthy than younger Internet 
businesses is called into question by the new commercial realities. Dy­
namic Internet startups are often worth (at least for a while) substantially 
more than older trademarked business. While most of us automatically 
associate the trademark "amazon" with the on-line book distributor 
<amazon.com>, the trademark was first appropriated by a different 
Amazon, the oldest feminist bookstore in the U.S.122 Such cases, raise 
the concern of "reverse hijacking"; that is, the fear of trademark owners 
attempting to "extort" successful Internet businesses. 
With a slight modification, my proposed auction mechanism can ac­
count for this scenario. If it is known that the domain-name registrant 
assigns a higher value to the name than does the trademark owner, rules 
(b) and (c) of the basic model should be reversed so that rule (b) would 
apply to the domain-name registrant and rule (c) to the trademark 
owner. This change can be effected by the auction administrator prior to 
the commencement of the auction. To decide which rules to apply, the 
auction administrator should look at the market valuations of the two 
bidding firms and then apply rule (b) to the company with the higher 
valuation and rule (c) to the one with the lower valuation.123 
This insight can be generalized. Assume that X and Y are involved 
in a domain name dispute, and that the value of X's business is higher 
than the value of Y's, such that Vex)> YcY)· To reflect this, the auction 
rules should state as follows: 
(a) Each bidder will post a bond in the amount of her bid. 
(b) If X submits the higher bid, she will get the domain name for 
a price equal to the bid of Y. 
(c) If, by contrast, Y submits a bid equal to, or higher than X's, Y 
will retain the domain name but she will have to pay the amount of 
her bid to X. 
121.  It is reasonable to assume that the two values, i.e., the value of the business and the value of 
the domain name to the business, are correlated. 
122. See Litman, supra note 120, at 153. 
123. The market valuations of the relevant businesses can be based on the value of the stock if the 
stock is traded and otherwise, financial reports and investment-memos. 
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(d) At the end of the auction, the domain name will become inal­
ienable for a period of two years. 
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Changing the auction rules, as suggested, affects the distribution of 
the "bargaining" surplus between the parties. While the original set of 
rules was inherently biased in favor of trademark owners, the modified 
rules avoid this systemic bias. Rather, from a distributive point of view, 
they give more protection to the party with the higher business valua­
tion - be it the trademark owner or the domain-name registrant.124 
Finally, to safeguard against abuse by big businesses, the proposed 
mechanism should only be employed when the disputed domain name is 
either identical ,  or strikingly similar to the trademark at issue.1zs Adopt­
ing a more lax standard of similarity may expose the mechanism to abuse 
by big businesses that may assay to use the proposed auction mechanism 
to extract payments from small businesses by frivolously challenging 
their entitlement to their intellectual property. The point and purpose of 
domain names is to enable potential customers to locate websites easily 
and efficiently. There is no need to expand domain-name law beyond 
this. Standard trademark law provides trademark owners with ample 
ammunition to combat infringers, dilutors, and tarnishers. 
D. A Cautionary Note 
I would like to end this essay on a cautionary note. It bears empha­
sis that the solution I craft in this essay is intended to serve as a remedial, 
transition mechanism. It seeks to resolve disputes between existing 
trademark owners and domain-name hold�rs. This may be accomplished 
by limiting the implementation of the auction, at least initially, to dis­
putes involving trademarks and domain names that were established by a 
certain date, e.g., June 1, 2001. Future trademark owners can effectively 
sidestep conflict by selecting a previously unregistered domain name as 
their trademark, thereby assuaging the problem of splintered intellectual 
property rights. Also, the introduction of new Top Level Domains 
(TLDs ), such as .firm and .store, should also help reduce the potential 
for future conflict by relieving to some extent the demand for the .com 
TLD.126 
124. Of course, if one aims to promote small businesses at the expense of larger ones, one can 
switch rules (b) and (c), so that rule (b) would apply to the lower-value business and rule (c) to the 
higher-value one. 
125. "Striking similarity" exists when there are only minor variations between the relevant trade­
mark and the domain name, for example, "kinko" and "kinkos." It is important to emphasize that the 
striking similarity standard is much strK:ter than the similarity necessary to prevail on a regular trade· 
mark-infringement claim, let alone trademark dilution. 
126. On November 16, 2000, ICANN announced its decision to introduce seven new Top Level 
Domains: .biz, .info, .name, .pro, .museum, .aero, and .coop. See Oscar S. Cisneros, ICANN: The 
Winners Are . . .  , WIRED, Nov. 16, 2000, available at http://www.wirednews.comlnews/politicsKI,l283, 
40228,00.html (on file with the University of Illinois Law Review). As expected, the proposed change 
is not without its critics. For example, Karl Auerbach, a Cisco Systems researcher who was recently 
elected to the ICANN board "asserted that ICANN is trying to replace market competition, which 
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It is noteworthy, however, that if the internal auctioning mechanism 
developed in this essay will have proven successful, with some modifica­
tions, it may serve to resolve many other disputes concerning Intellectual 
Property. For example, it can be employed to settle disputes between 
junior and senior trademark holders, original patentees and improvers, 
and copyright owners and fair users. 
V. CONCLUSION 
Auctions provide a potent tool for overcoming the twin problems of 
private information and strategic posturing in negotiations. As such, auc­
tions can be employed in a wide array of legal contexts, especially trans­
actional ones. In this essay, I crafted an internal, sealed-bid auction with 
asymmetric bidding rules to resolve disputes over domain names. I dem­
onstrated that the proposed mechanism enhances efficient allocation of 
domain names, as well as provides adequate compensation to the losing 
party. Because in internal auctions it is the parties who determine their 
payoffs, the loser is guaranteed an amount equal to, or in excess of, her 
own private value at the end of the auction. Thus, my proposed mecha­
nism promotes allocative efficiency, without sacrificing fairness. In addi­
tion, the use of my proposal could effect a substantial reduction in dis­
pute resolution costs, both in terms of money and time. 
Due to their information-forcing property, one would expect auc­
tions to be widely used in the information age; yet, insofar as the legal 
system is concerned, auctions remain extremely underused. Rather than 
exploring information-forcing mechanisms, legislators prefer to rely on 
long-standing concepts, such as good faith, even when the ability of these 
concepts to do the work is dubious. Relative to the existing solutions ­
the ACPA and UDRP - the implementation of my proposal could have: 
(1) improved the allocation of resources, (2) reduced dispute resolution 
costs, and (3) saved the cost of enacting the ACPA. 
should determine which domains succeed and fail." Chris Gaither, Agency to Vote on Web Domain 
Names, N.Y. nMfS, Nov. 16, 2000, at C4. Furthermore, Economic Solutions, a St Louis·based com­
pany that owns the rights to Belize's domain, .bz, requested a federal court to enjoin ICANN from 
issuing .biz on the ground that the similarity between the two names violates its intellectual property 
rights. Although the court denied Economic Solutions its request, the threat of additional lawsuits still 
looms large. See id. 
